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THE TWO VERSIONS OF RATIONAL-BASIS REVIEW 
AND SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS 
Robert C. Farrell* 
Abstract: Although it purports to be a single standard, equal protection’s rational-basis 
review has two faces that use different methods and produce conflicting results. The United 
States Supreme Court employs both versions but does not acknowledge that a conflict exists 
between them. Without an explicit acknowledgment of the contradictory nature of the two 
rationality reviews, it follows that the Court has made no effort to explain in what context 
one version should be used and in what context the other is appropriate. As a result, it is very 
difficult to predict with accuracy the outcome of arguments based on equal protection’s 
rational-basis review in the lower courts because no matter which side a court picks, it can 
find U.S. Supreme Court precedents to support the result. In recent years, this problem of 
unpredictability has been particularly acute in cases challenging laws that disadvantage 
persons involved in same-sex relationships. Because rational-basis review is ordinarily 
deferential to legislative judgment, these challenges usually fail. There is, however, a core of 
successful rational-basis claims that involve a more demanding scrutiny and seem to 
contradict the results in the more typical cases. This creates unpredictability. This Article 
examines this duality in three factual settings: (1) state laws that define marriage as limited to 
a man and a woman, (2) the United States military’s policy of excluding gays and lesbians 
from military service, and (3) the federal Defense of Marriage Act, which limits federal 
recognition of marriage to opposite-sex couples. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Equal protection’s rational-basis review is like a tale of two cities, or 
perhaps like the story of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, or even like the two-
faced Roman god Janus, who simultaneously looked out in opposite 
directions. Although rationality review purports to be one standard, it 
has two faces that use different methods and produce conflicting results. 
The United States Supreme Court employs both versions but does not 
acknowledge that a conflict exists between them. Without an explicit 
acknowledgment of the contradictory nature of the two rationality 
reviews, it follows that the Court has made no effort to explain in what 
context one version should be used and in what context the other is 
appropriate. As a result, it is very difficult to predict the outcome of 
arguments based on equal protection’s rational-basis review in the lower 
federal courts because, regardless of which basis is chosen, a lower court 
can find U.S. Supreme Court precedents to support the result. 
In recent years, this problem of unpredictability has been particularly 
acute in cases challenging laws that disadvantage persons engaged in 
same-sex relationships. Because rational-basis review is ordinarily 
deferential to legislative judgment, these challenges usually fail. There 
is, however, a core of successful rational-basis claims that involve a 
more demanding scrutiny and seem to contradict the results in more 
typical cases. This creates unpredictability. This Article examines this 
issue in three factual settings: (1) state laws that define marriage as 
limited to a man and a woman, (2) the U.S. military’s policy of 
excluding gays and lesbians from military service,1 and (3) the federal 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which limits federal recognition of 
marriage to opposite-sex couples. 
Challenges to laws that disadvantage gays and lesbians are generally 
based on one of three different legal arguments: (1) that they infringe on 
a fundamental liberty identified in Lawrence v. Texas2 and are thus 
                                                     
1. Congress ended this longstanding military policy in December 2010. See Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515; see also infra notes 233–34 and 
accompanying text. 
2. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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subject to heightened judicial review; (2) that they discriminate against a 
suspect or quasi-suspect class and are thus, once again, subject to 
heightened judicial review; or (3) that they do not even survive rational-
basis review under the Equal Protection Clause. This Article examines 
the rational-basis argument and explores the two-fold and contradictory 
nature of rational-basis review. 
Part I of this Article identifies the basic elements of equal protection’s 
rationality standard, including the differing techniques that lead to the 
two different versions of the doctrine. Part II examines the leading U.S. 
Supreme Court cases on each side of the rationality divide. Part III 
considers these two versions of rationality review in a particular factual 
setting—equal protection challenges to laws that disadvantage gays and 
lesbians. 
I. EQUAL PROTECTION’S RATIONAL-BASIS REVIEW 
A. Creating the Rational-Basis Standard 
The command of equality is essentially comparative. It requires a 
comparison of one entity with another entity.3 Since Aristotle, the idea 
of equality has been understood to involve the comparative command 
that those similarly situated should be treated similarly.4 Most equal-
protection cases involve a comparison of two different classes.5 To 
classify is to identify a trait that makes a person a member of a class (all 
those over age fifty, for example) and then to ascribe a certain treatment 
(such as forced retirement) for those who, having the trait, are members 
of the class.6 The typical equality challenge to this kind of classification 
compares one class of persons (those who have the trait) with a second 
                                                     
3. See, e.g., Griffin Indus. Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d. 1189, 1205 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Adjudging 
equality necessarily requires comparison . . . .”); Buckles v. Columbus Mun. Airport Auth., No. CS-
00-986, 2002 WL 193853, at *13 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2002) (“An equal protection claim simply 
cannot exist absent an allegation that, compared to others, the plaintiff was treated less favorably.” 
(emphasis in original)). 
4. Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 543 (1982) (quoting 
ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICOMACHEA V.3.1131a–.1131b (W. Ross, trans., 1925)). 
5. Though equality arguments require at least two entities to compare, they do not require any 
more than two entities. Thus, it is not necessary to compare groups of people in order to make 
equality arguments. See, e.g.,Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (recognizing 
a “class of one” claim). But the more common kind of equality argument, particularly in the legal 
sphere, is the one that compares two classes of persons. See infra Part II.B. 
6. The classic treatment of the process of classification and its place in the making of equal 
protection arguments is Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 
CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949). 
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class of persons (those without the trait) and argues that, because the two 
classes are similarly situated, the members of both classes should be 
treated similarly.7 
The difficulty in applying this similarly-situated standard is the 
critical determination of who is similar to whom and therefore entitled to 
similar treatment. This question of similarity is unanswerable in the 
abstract. On the one hand, all human beings are similar to all other 
human beings in having, for example, a human genome, and are 
therefore arguably entitled to similar treatment. At the same time, all 
human beings are unique—entities with their own genes and life 
experience—and thus different from everyone else and entitled or 
subject to different treatment. The difficulty in solving this conundrum is 
substantial. Peter Westen has called it an impossible task—one that 
makes the idea of equality an empty thing.8 
Courts applying the Equal Protection Clause have addressed the 
problem of identifying who is similar to whom by referring to an 
external criterion—the purpose for which the classification was made. 
Thus, for example, all persons over the age of fifty share a trait that 
makes them members of a class. Are they similarly situated to 
individuals in a class made up of people younger than fifty? It depends 
on whether this age classification is relevant to its purpose. If the 
purpose of the classification is to identify individuals who still have 
sufficient vigor to perform a physically demanding job like police work, 
then the two classes might be considered differently situated, as fitness 
declines with age.9 If, however, the purpose of the classification is to 
determine who is eligible to vote, then the two classes appear to be 
similarly situated, because physical vigor bears little relation to voting 
ability. It is on this understanding—that there must be some correlation 
between classification and purpose—that the U.S. Supreme Court has 
developed equal protection’s rational-basis standard.10 
                                                     
7. See generally id. at 344–47. 
8. See Westen, supra note 4, at 560 (asserting that stating one’s conclusion in terms of “‘equals’ 
or ‘unequals’ is entirely superfluous”). 
9. The example here of the classification that requires police officers to retire at age fifty is based 
on the facts of Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). 
10. On equal protection’s rational-basis test, see generally Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational 
Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 
357 (1999); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481 (2004); Leslie 
Friedman Goldstein, Between the Tiers: The New[est] Equal Protection and Bush v. Gore, 4 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 372 (2002); Stephen E. Gottlieb, Tears for Tiers on the Rehnquist Court, 4 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 350 (2002); R. Randall Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause 
and Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The “Base Plus Six” Model and 
Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225 (2002); Clark Neily, No Such Thing: 
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The standard is easy to state—a classification must be rationally 
related to a legitimate governmental interest or purpose11— but has been 
difficult to apply consistently. In order to apply the standard, a court 
must (1) identify the classification, (2) identify the purpose, and (3) 
determine whether or not the classification is adequately correlated with 
that purpose. When the Court considers whether or not a classification is 
rationally related to a permissible interest, it follows either one of two 
very different lines of analysis. The first is a deferential standard that 
frequently amounts to no review at all, and the second is a more 
demanding version that carefully weighs evidence of the correlation 
between a classification and the actual purpose of a law. Part II of this 
Article examines the two different versions of what it means for a 
classification to be rationally related to a permissible purpose. 
B. Identifying the Classification 
The first element of the analysis—identifying the classification—is 
usually the simplest and least likely to create conflict between the 
different versions of rational-basis review. Most commonly, the 
classification in a statute or regulation is explicit. For example, a statute 
that requires all state police officers to retire at age fifty12 is an explicit 
age classification; a statute that prohibits the sale of milk in plastic 
containers13 is a classification of milk container makers; and a regulation 
that forbids the hiring of anyone using narcotics14 is a classification of 
narcotics users. 
Rarely do the parties in actual litigated cases dispute the nature of the 
classification. On occasion, however, the nature of the classification is 
hidden.15 Thus, for example, a state provision that freezes property tax 
                                                     
Litigating Under the Rational Basis Test, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 898 (2005); Huong Thien 
Nguyen, Note, Irrational Prejudice: The Military’s Exclusion of Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Service 
Members After Romer v. Evans, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 461 (2001); Note, The Irrational 
Application of Rational Basis: Kimel, Garrett, and Congressional Power to Abrogate State 
Sovereign Immunity, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2146 (2001); Neelum J. Wadhwani, Note, Rational 
Reviews, Irrational Results, 84 TEX. L. REV. 801 (2006). 
11. E.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (“The general rule is 
that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the 
statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”). 
12. E.g., Murgia, 427 U.S. at 311. 
13. E.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981). 
14. E.g., N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979). 
15. For example, in cases where a facially neutral statute or ordinance has a disproportionate 
racial impact, it constitutes a racial classification only if it can be proven that it was adopted for a 
racially discriminatory purpose. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976). Similarly, a 
 
05 - 051911 Farrell Post Author Final Read.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/21/2011  7:39 PM 
286 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:281 
 
assessments at the time of purchase could be viewed as a disguised 
classification distinguishing between newcomers and established 
residents;16 and a statute that caps the benefits that the state will provide 
to families in its welfare program could be viewed as a wealth 
classification.17 Notwithstanding these last two examples, however, the 
identification of the classification is, in general, the most straightforward 
and least controversial element of a rational-basis argument. 
C. Identifying the Purpose of the Law 
The second element, identifying the purpose of a law, is more 
difficult to explain. As a starting point, there is not even agreement on 
the meaning of “the purpose of the law.” At one extreme, it is urged that 
the very idea of a law’s having a purpose is incoherent, because (1) a 
legislature does not have a mind that could form a purpose,18 (2) a multi-
member body cannot have a single intent,19 (3) the alleged purpose of a 
law varies significantly depending on the generality with which the 
purpose is expressed,20 and (4) laws frequently serve more than one 
purpose.21 To the extent that these arguments about the incoherence of 
legislative purpose prevail, the rational-basis standard, which requires a 
certain relationship between the classification in a law and the law’s 
purpose, is itself incoherent. 
The courts, however, generally have not been persuaded that the idea 
of legislative purpose is incoherent. The courts have adopted a more 
                                                     
facially neutral statute that disproportionately affects women constitutes a gender classification only 
if it was enacted with the purpose of disadvantaging women. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 
U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
16. E.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 12 (1992) (discussing different treatment of new owners 
and old owners). 
17. E.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (“The administration of public welfare 
assistance, by contrast, involves the most basic needs of impoverished human beings.”). 
18. Robert W. Bennett, “Mere” Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and 
Democratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1049, 1071 (1979) (“The concept of ‘purpose,’ even more 
than that of rationality, presumes individual intelligence.”); Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr., Legislative 
Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754, 764 (1966) (“Legislation is a group activity and it is impossible to 
conceive a group mind or [group] cerebration.” (quoting ALBERT KOCOUREK, AN INTRODUCTION 
TO THE SCIENCE OF LAW 201 (1930))). 
19. See, e.g., Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 
142 (1972) (“How is a court to determine which consequences a majority of the legislators had in 
mind when each legislator might have had several motivations and no majority had the same set of 
motivations?”). 
20. See Robert C. Farrell, Legislative Purpose and Equal Protection’s Rationality Review, 37 
VILL. L. REV. 1, 15–17 (1992). 
21. Id. at 17–20. 
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objective, pragmatic understanding of the concept of “the purpose of a 
law.” In this understanding, the purpose of a law does not depend on a 
legislature’s having a mind or on complete unanimity of the legislators 
who voted for the law. The purpose of a law is the end at which a law is 
directed.22 This end may be stated negatively as “the elimination of a 
public ‘mischief,’” or affirmatively as “the achievement of some positive 
public good.”23 
This understanding of legislative purpose, while not requiring a 
legislative mind or legislative unanimity, does assume that there is some 
distinction between the classification created by a law and the purpose 
on account of which the law was enacted. We cannot derive the purpose 
of a law solely from its operative effect. Thus, for example, we might 
ask, “What is the purpose of a law that requires state police officers to 
retire at age fifty?” It would not be useful to say the purpose of that law 
is to assure that state police officers retire at age fifty. By collapsing the 
difference between classification and purpose and thus “presuming 
purpose from result,” the analysis is “reduce[d] . . . to tautology.”24 
Rational-basis review assumes that a law has a purpose independent of 
its effect. Thus, it is likely that the purpose of a law that requires police 
officers to retire at age fifty is to promote public safety by assuring that 
officers are physically fit.25 The rational-basis question would then be 
whether or not the classification (police officers over fifty) is adequately 
correlated with the purpose of the law (eliminating unfit police officers). 
Even, however, where there is no great dispute in the courts about the 
concept of legislative purpose, there is substantial disagreement under 
equal protection’s rational-basis standard on how a court should identify 
what that purpose is. Here, the differences between the two versions of 
rational-basis review begin to become apparent. 
Courts applying the traditional, deferential version of rational-basis 
review do not attempt to discern the actual purpose of a statute. Courts in 
such cases have no interest in evidence as to the actual purpose of the 
law.26 Rather, these courts are quite willing to hypothesize the purpose 
of a law or to accept the post-hoc rationalizations of government 
attorneys as to what is the purpose of the law.27 
                                                     
22. Id. at 3. 
23. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 6, at 346. 
24. See U.S.R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 187 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
25. See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976). 
26. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993). 
27. See Fritz, 449 U.S. at 186–87 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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Where courts follow this practice and are willing to hypothesize 
purpose or accept post-hoc assertions of purpose by government 
lawyers, rational-basis review becomes so deferential as to amount to 
virtually no review at all.28 Even the most egregiously unfair laws could 
survive this kind of scrutiny. Consider, for example, a regulation that 
excludes narcotics users from all jobs with the public transit authority. 
Even if the regulation had in fact been adopted for the purpose of 
excluding racial minorities from the transit authority—an impermissible 
purpose—it could be upheld if a court were willing to hypothesize that 
the law’s purpose is to promote safety.29 Where a law has been enacted 
to protect the vested pension benefits of a particular class, but does not 
accomplish its stated purpose, the law can be upheld if a court 
hypothesizes, even without evidence, that the law’s real purpose is to 
protect “career railroaders.”30 A law that on its face appears to give a 
naked and impermissible preference to long-term residents over 
newcomers might be upheld if a court is willing to hypothesize, again 
without evidence, that the law’s purpose is to promote neighborhood 
stability and to protect reliance interests.31 This willingness of courts to 
hypothesize governmental purposes is a cornerstone of the deferential 
version of rational-basis review. 
On the other hand, when a court is applying the more demanding 
version of rationality review, it looks to the record in the case for 
evidence of the actual purpose of a law. For evidence of actual purpose, 
a court might look at (1) a statement of purpose within the statute 
itself,32 (2) legislative history, including committee reports and the 
statements of individual legislators that make up the record of debate on 
the legislative floor,33 (3) the effects of a law, if they are sufficiently 
                                                     
28. See Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 316 (“This necessity renders the precise coordinates of the 
resulting legislative judgment virtually unreviewable since the legislature must be allowed leeway 
to approach a perceived problem incrementally.”). 
29. E.g., N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (upholding regulation as a safety 
rule with the dissent suggesting that it was designed to keep out minorities). 
30. See infra notes 48–61 and accompanying text.    
31. E.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 21 (1992) (upholding state constitutional amendment as 
designed to promote neighborhood stability and to protect reliance interests). The dissent in 
Nordlinger viewed the amendment as enacted to benefit those it benefits. Id. at 39 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
32. E.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61 n.7 (1982) (citing purposes of Alaska statute as 
enumerated in the statute itself). 
33. E.g., Lyng v. Int’l Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 371 (1988) (citing Senate Committee Report 
as evidence of statutory purpose); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (citing 
statement of Senator Holland in Congressional Record as evidence of statutory purpose). 
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stark as to provide no alternate explanation for the law,34 (4) the 
historical background leading up to the adoption of a law,35 or (5) the 
specific sequence of events that led to the adoption of a statute.36 
Once a court applying the more demanding version of rationality 
review identifies the actual purpose of a law, it then examines that 
purpose to see whether it is impermissible. Although the U.S. Supreme 
Court has not formalized a test for determining what constitutes an 
impermissible purpose, it has found that the following are all 
impermissible purposes: naked antagonism toward a particular group,37 a 
mere desire to harm a particular group,38 prejudice against a particular 
group,39 the public endorsement of private bias,40 disadvantaging a 
particular group based on animus or animosity toward the group,41 and 
giving effect to stereotypical views about the roles of a particular class.42 
Justice Stevens has further explained this concept of impermissible 
purpose: “The term ‘rational,’ of course, includes a requirement that an 
impartial lawmaker could logically believe that the classification would 
serve a legitimate public purpose that transcends the harm to the 
members of the disadvantaged class.”43 Stevens has also explained that if 
“the adverse impact on the disfavored class is an apparent aim of the 
                                                     
34. E.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340–42 (1960) (holding that a statute altering the 
shape of Tuskegee from a square to an “irregular” twenty-eight-sided figure that removes almost all 
black residents but no white residents was evidence of racial discrimination). 
35. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267 (1977). 
36. Id. 
37. E.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“Pressing public necessity may 
sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.”). 
38. E.g., U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (“For if the constitutional 
conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a 
bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate 
governmental interest.” (emphasis in original)). 
39. E.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (“The short of it is 
that requiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the 
mentally retarded . . . .”). 
40. E.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (“Private biases may be outside the reach of 
the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”). 
41. E.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632, 634 (1996) (“[T]he amendment seems inexplicable 
by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state 
interests . . . . [L]aws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage 
imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected.”). 
42. E.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982) (“Care must be taken in 
ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions. Thus, if 
the statutory objective is to exclude or ‘protect’ members of one gender because they are presumed 
to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate.”). 
43. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 452 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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legislature, its impartiality would be suspect. If, however, the adverse 
impact may reasonably be viewed as an acceptable cost of achieving a 
larger goal, an impartial lawmaker could rationally decide that that cost 
should be incurred.”44 Thus, for example, a general sales tax enacted as a 
revenue raising device is acceptable even though it has the unintended 
effect of falling more harshly on the poor than the rich, but a tax adopted 
with the purpose of harming the poor would not be acceptable. 
D. Determining the Required Correlation Between Classification and 
Purpose 
Once the purpose of a law has been determined (by whatever method 
a court uses), rational-basis review requires a court to determine whether 
the classification is rationally related to that purpose. Here again, the two 
different versions of rationality review apply two very different 
techniques. Under the traditional, deferential version, the classification 
at issue need not be correlated in fact, even in relation to an assumed 
purpose for which there need not be any evidence. It is enough if a 
legislature could reasonably have assumed that there was such a 
correlation, even if the legislature was wrong.45 
On the other hand, in those rationality cases where the U.S. Supreme 
Court has applied a more demanding standard, it will typically search the 
record for evidence of a correlation between classification and purpose, 
and it will also insist that there actually be such a correlation.46 In these 
cases, the Court searches for “evidence” in the “record” to assure that 
there is an actual correlation between classification and purpose; that is, 
to assure that the state in fact “got it right.” This is obviously a quite 
different standard than the Court follows in deferential rationality cases. 
II. THE LEADING U.S. SUPREME COURT CASES ON BOTH 
SIDES OF THE RATIONAL-BASIS DIVIDE 
A. The Deferential Version 
There is no shortage of U.S. Supreme Court cases illustrating the 
deferential version of rationality review; in fact, the deferential version 
is the established version used in a very high percentage of rationality 
                                                     
44. U.S.R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 181 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
45. E.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981). 
46. E.g., City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448; see infra notes 112–18 and accompanying text. 
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decisions.47 This section examines a small selection of those cases that 
are particularly good examples of how accommodating this version can 
be. 
U.S. Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz48 is an outstanding example 
of the Court’s willingness to hypothesize legislative purpose, not only 
without any evidence of actual purpose, but even in the face of contrary 
evidence of actual purpose. In Fritz, the Court considered a federal 
statute promoting the fiscal soundness of the Railroad Retirement 
System by limiting railroad workers’ ability to qualify for dual benefits 
under both the Railroad Retirement and the Social Security systems.49 If 
the Court had been interested in the actual purpose of the statute, it 
might have looked at the House and Senate Reports that accompanied 
the bill.50 Those reports contained sections entitled, “Principal Purpose 
of the Bill.”51 These sections included the declaration: “Persons who 
already have vested rights under both the Railroad Retirement and the 
Social Security systems will in the future be permitted to receive 
benefits computed under both systems just as is true under existing 
law.”52 As the dissenting Justices in Fritz pointed out, this legislative 
history made it clear that preserving vested benefits was one of the 
principal purposes of the Act.53 However, the Act as actually passed 
divided workers with vested benefits into two classes and preserved 
those vested benefits only for a portion of those vested workers who met 
at least one of three additional tests.54 In relation to a purpose of 
protecting vested benefits, this distinction made no sense, because all 
workers whose benefits were vested were similarly situated in relation to 
a purpose to preserve vested benefits. 
The majority in Fritz, however, was not bothered by the absence of a 
rationale for the distinction drawn by the statute. Instead, the majority 
                                                     
47. One study reported that during the period from 1971 through 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided 110 rationality cases and the plaintiffs prevailed in only ten cases, a success rate of only 
nine percent. See Farrell, supra note 10, at 370. 
48. 449 U.S. 166 (1980). 
49. Id. at 168–73. 
50. See generally H.R. REP. NO. 93-1345 (1974); S. REP. NO. 93-1163 (1974); 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5702. 
51. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1345, at 1; S. REP. NO. 93-1163, at 1. 
52. H.R. REP. NO. 93-1345, at 2; S. REP. NO. 93-1163, at 2. 
53. Fritz, 449 U.S. at 185–86 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
54. In order to retain the additional benefit, those who were vested in both systems also had to 
meet one of the following tests: “(1) performed some railroad service in 1974 or (2) had a ‘current 
connection’ with the railroad industry as of December 31, 1974, or (3) completed 25 years of 
railroad service as of December 31, 1974.” Fritz, 449 U.S. at 171–72 (footnote omitted). 
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identified a different statutory purpose—protecting career railroad 
employees.55 The majority then found that the statutory distinctions were 
correlated with that purpose because those workers whose benefits were 
vested and who also met one of the three additional tests were more 
likely to have had careers in the railroad.56 But where did this statutory 
purpose—to protect career railroaders—come from? The Court cited no 
evidence from the statute, the legislative history, the problem that had 
precipitated the passage of the Act, or anything else. The purpose of 
protecting career railroaders was suggested by the appellant during the 
course of litigation.57 The absence of evidence of this purpose was 
irrelevant: “Where, as here, there are plausible reasons for Congress’ 
action, our inquiry is at an end. It is, of course, ‘constitutionally 
irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative 
decision,’ because this Court has never insisted that a legislative body 
articulate its reasons for enacting a statute.”58 
The dissenters in Fritz critiqued the majority’s reasoning on the 
grounds that “the rational-basis standard ‘is not a toothless one,’ and will 
not be satisfied by flimsy or implausible justifications for the legislative 
classification, proffered after the fact by Government attorneys.”59 
Further, according to the dissenters, “the actual purposes of Congress, 
rather than the post hoc justifications offered by Government attorneys, 
must be the primary basis for analysis under the rational-basis test.”60 
Finally, according to the dissent, the majority had disregarded “the 
actual stated purpose of Congress in favor of a justification which was 
never suggested by any Representative or Senator, and which in fact 
conflicts with the stated congressional purpose.”61 Of course, none of 
that mattered, for under the majority’s deferential version of rationality 
review, the actual purpose of a statute is irrelevant. 
Nordlinger v. Hahn62 is another good example of the Court’s 
willingness to hypothesize the purpose of a law, even where there is no 
evidence to support that hypothesis. Nordlinger involved a challenge to 
                                                     
55. Id. at 177–79. 
56. Id. at 178. 
57. Id. at 177 (“The classification here is not arbitrary, says appellant, because it is an attempt to 
protect the relative equities of employees and to provide benefits to career railroad employees.”). 
58. Id. at 179 (citation omitted). 
59. See id. at 184 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 
(1976)). 
60. Id. at 187 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
61. Id. at 186 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
62. 505 U.S. 1 (1992). 
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Proposition 13, an amendment to the California State Constitution that 
adopted an acquisition value assessment scheme for the calculation of 
property taxes.63 The long-term effect of such a system was a substantial 
financial preference for long-time homeowners over newcomers.64 
Because the amendment was adopted as a referendum, there was no 
legislative history to explain the purpose of the law. In his dissenting 
opinion, Justice Stevens viewed the law as advancing an impermissible 
naked preference for long-time owners.65 As Justice Stevens explained, a 
benefit for earlier purchasers cannot be justified on the ground that it 
benefits earlier purchasers.66 
For the majority, however, the absence of any identified, permissible 
purpose for the law was not a problem. According to the Court: 
In general, the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied so long as 
there is a plausible policy reason for the classification, the 
legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based 
rationally may have been considered to be true by the 
governmental decisionmaker, and the relationship of the 
classification to its goal is not so attenuated as to render the 
distinction arbitrary or irrational.67 
Such a plausible policy reason, the Court further clarified, may be 
inferred: “To be sure, the Equal Protection Clause does not demand for 
purposes of rational-basis review that a legislature or governing 
decisionmaker actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale 
supporting its classification.”68 
Following this “no evidence required” standard, the Court had no 
difficulty in plucking out of thin air “two rational considerations of 
difference or policy” that would justify the different treatment of 
longtime and newer homeowners: (1) “neighborhood preservation, 
continuity, and stability,” and (2) protecting the reliance interests of 
longtime homeowners.69 
                                                     
63. Id. at 4–5. 
64. Id. at 6. 
65. Id. at 30 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“To my mind, the rationale for such disparity is not merely 
‘negligible,’ it is nonexistent. Such a law establishes a privilege of a medieval character: Two 
families with equal needs and equal resources are treated differently solely because of their different 
heritage.”). 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 11 (citations omitted). 
68. Id. at 15 (citations omitted) (citing McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of Chi., 394 U.S. 
802, 809 (1969) (stating, as summarized by the Nordlinger majority: “legitimate state purpose may 
be ascertained even when the legislative or administrative history is silent”)). 
69. Id. at 12–13. 
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In addition to the Court’s willingness to hypothesize the purpose of a 
law, the other hallmark of deferential rationality is the Court’s 
willingness to accept conceivable rather than actual connections between 
the challenged classification and the purpose of the law, even if there is 
in fact no such connection. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.70 is 
a good example of this kind of reasoning. In that case, the Minnesota 
Legislature had enacted a law that prohibited the sale of milk in plastic 
containers.71 The statutory language indicated that its purpose was to 
protect the environment.72 Opponents of the law, however, had 
introduced evidence at trial that the ban on plastic milk containers was 
actually harmful to the environment and the Minnesota Supreme Court 
had upheld that finding.73 That evidence turned out not to matter. The 
United States Supreme Court explained: 
States are not required to convince the courts of the correctness 
of their legislative judgments. Rather, “those challenging the 
legislative judgment must convince the court that the legislative 
facts on which the classification is apparently based could not 
reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental 
decisionmaker.” 
  Although parties challenging legislation under the Equal 
Protection Clause may introduce evidence supporting their claim 
that it is irrational, they cannot prevail so long as “it is evident 
from all the considerations presented to [the legislature], and 
those of which we may take judicial notice, that the question is 
at least debatable.” Where there was evidence before the 
legislature reasonably supporting the classification, litigants may 
not procure invalidation of the legislation merely by tendering 
evidence in court that the legislature was mistaken.74 
This meant that all of the evidence introduced in the trial court, which 
showed that the alternative paperboard containers were more harmful to 
the environment than the banned plastic containers, was irrelevant. 
These two pillars of deference—hypothesizing purpose and not 
insisting on an actual connection between classification and purpose—
taken together produce a standard under which virtually any 
classification can survive rational-basis review. Two U.S. Supreme 
Court cases from the early 1990s are powerful illustrations of this point. 
                                                     
70. 449 U.S. 456 (1981). 
71. Id. at 458. 
72. Id. at 458–59. 
73. Id. at 460. 
74. Id. at 464 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
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In FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc.,75 the Court considered a 
challenge to a Federal Communication Commission (FCC) regulation 
that exempted from regulation certain cable systems that served one or 
more buildings under common ownership or management and that did 
not use any public right of way.76 Opponents of the FCC rule argued 
successfully in the lower court that there were no real differences 
between the regulated and unregulated cable systems.77 It was, of course, 
quite clear that this equal protection claim would not be successful 
because it had been more than thirty-five years since the Court last 
invalidated a purely business regulation on equal protection grounds,78 
and that one case was later overruled.79 
What was surprising was the breadth of the Court’s opinion, its 
expansive discussion of how difficult it is to mount a successful rational-
basis challenge, and the fact that eight of the nine Justices joined in the 
opinion. According to Beach Communications: 
  On rational-basis review, a classification in a statute such as 
the Cable Act comes to us bearing a strong presumption of 
validity, and those attacking the rationality of the legislative 
classification have the burden “to negative every conceivable 
basis which might support it.” Moreover, because we never 
require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a 
statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes 
whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction 
actually motivated the legislature. Thus, the absence of 
“‘legislative facts’” explaining the distinction “[o]n the record,” 
has no significance in rational-basis analysis.” See Nordlinger v. 
Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (equal protection “does not demand for 
purposes of rational-basis review that a legislature or governing 
decisionmaker actually articulate at any time the purpose or 
rationale supporting its classification”). In other words, a 
legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and 
may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence 
or empirical data.80 
The Court then explained that the necessity of drawing lines in a 
regulatory system “inevitably requires that some persons who have an 
                                                     
75. 508 U.S. 307 (1993). 
76. Id. at 309. 
77. Id. at 311–12. 
78. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957). 
79. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 306 (1976). 
80. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 314–15 (citations omitted). 
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almost equally strong claim to favored treatment be placed on different 
sides of the line . . . . This necessity renders the precise coordinates of 
the resulting legislative judgment virtually unreviewable . . . .”81 The 
Court then found that a regulatory efficiency model, under which 
government would not regulate those systems for which the costs of 
regulation would outweigh the benefits to consumers, “provide[d] a 
conceivable basis for the common-ownership exemption.”82 This was so 
because “[a] legislator might rationally assume that systems serving only 
commonly owned or managed buildings without crossing public rights-
of-way would typically be limited in size . . . .”83 In response to the 
argument that Congress had not in fact intended common ownership “to 
be a surrogate for small size,”84 the Court stated: “Whether the posited 
reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated Congress is 
‘constitutionally irrelevant . . . .’”85 The Court further explained that 
Congress might have had reasons other than the crossing of a public 
right of way to justify its exemption of certain cable systems: 
As we have indicated, however, there are plausible rationales 
unrelated to the use of public rights-of-way for regulating cable 
facilities serving separately owned and managed buildings. The 
assumptions underlying these rationales may be erroneous, but 
the very fact that they are “arguable” is sufficient, on rational-
basis review, to “immuniz[e]” the congressional choice from 
constitutional challenge.86 
Three weeks after Beach Communications, the Court reiterated the 
extraordinarily deferential standard in an unexpected context. In Heller 
v. Doe,87 the Court considered a challenge to a Kentucky statute 
concerning procedures for involuntary civil commitment.88 Under the 
statute, it was easier to commit a mentally disabled person than it was to 
commit a person who was mentally ill.89 Notwithstanding earlier 
                                                     
81. Id. at 315–16 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
82. Id. at 317–18. 
83. Id. at 318. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. (citation omitted). 
86. Id. at 320 (alteration in original). 
87. 509 U.S. 312 (1993). 
88. Id. at 314. 
89. It was easier for two reasons. First, the burden of proof for involuntary commitment based on 
mental disability was “clear and convincing evidence” compared to “beyond a reasonable doubt” for 
mental illness. Id. at 317. Second, in commitment proceedings for mental disability, but not for 
mental illness, guardians and immediate family members were allowed to participate as parties. Id. 
at 316–17. 
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precedent suggesting that the U.S. Supreme Court would look closely at 
classifications disadvantaging the mentally disabled,90 the Heller Court 
not only upheld Kentucky’s procedural distinctions, but did so with an 
extremely broad statement on the limits of its review. According to the 
Court, rational-basis review “is not a license for courts to judge the 
wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.”91 Classifications not 
involving fundamental rights or suspect lines are “accorded a strong 
presumption of validity” and will be upheld “if there is a rational 
relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate 
governmental purpose.”92 The legislature “need not ‘actually articulate at 
any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification,’” which 
“‘must be upheld . . . if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts 
that could provide a rational basis for the classification.’”93 Furthermore, 
a state is under “no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the 
rationality of a statutory classification.” The classification “may be 
based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical 
data.”94 Rather, “[t]he burden is on the one attacking the legislative 
arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support 
it.”95 
Applying this deferential version of rational-basis review, the Court 
had no difficulty in upholding the distinctions created by the statute. 
According to the Court: (1) there was a “reasonably conceivable state of 
facts from which Kentucky could conclude that [danger to self or others] 
is established more easily, as a general rule, in the case of the mentally 
retarded”;96 (2) the “ease of diagnosis . . . [was] not ‘wholly irrelevant’ 
to the achievement of Kentucky’s objective”;97 (3) “it would have been 
plausible for the Kentucky Legislature to believe that most mentally 
retarded individuals who are committed receive treatment that is 
different from . . . that to which the mentally ill are subjected”;98 and (4) 
“the question is at least debatable.”99 Nowhere in the opinion did the 
                                                     
90. See infra notes 112–18 and accompanying text (discussing heightened scrutiny applied by the 
Court in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc, 473 U.S. 432 (1985)). 
91. Heller, 509 U.S. at 319 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
92. Id. at 320 (citations omitted). 
93. Id. (citations omitted). 
94. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
95. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
96. Id. at 323 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
97. Id. at 324. 
98. Id. at 326. 
99. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Court search the record for evidence to support Kentucky’s choices on 
commitment procedures. The Heller Court’s entire discussion of civil 
commitment took place on a hypothetical plane where the Court did not 
consider whether there was an appropriate commitment process for the 
mentally disabled in Kentucky but instead whether there was any 
conceivable justification for the procedures that Kentucky had in fact 
adopted. As the Court had declared in Beach Communications, the 
legislative judgment is “virtually unreviewable.”100 
B. The More Demanding Version of Rationality Review 
On the other hand, in a small minority of cases, the U.S. Supreme 
Court sometimes applies the rational-basis standard in a more 
demanding fashion. When it does, it frequently invalidates the 
challenged governmental action. From the smaller group of cases that 
apply a more demanding version of rationality, three—United States 
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,101 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center, Inc.,102 and Romer v. Evans103—are particularly good 
examples of the techniques of heightened rationality. In these three 
cases, the Court: (1) looked for evidence of actual purpose and, having 
identified that purpose, ruled it out as impermissible; or (2) examined 
whether the classification actually advanced the law’s stated purpose. 
In the first of these cases, Moreno, the Court reviewed an amendment 
to the Food Stamp Act that redefined the term “household” to exclude 
any household that contained unrelated individuals.104 The government, 
defending the “unrelated individual” rule, argued that “Congress might 
rationally have thought . . . that households with one or more unrelated 
members are more likely than ‘fully related’ households to contain 
individuals who abuse the program by fraudulently failing to report 
sources of income or by voluntarily remaining poor.”105 The Court, 
characterizing these assertions as “unsubstantiated assumptions 
concerning the differences between ‘related’ and ‘unrelated’ 
households,”106 determined that the “unrelated individual” rule was not a 
                                                     
100. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 316 (1993) (emphasis added). 
101. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
102. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
103. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
104. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 529. 
105. Id. at 535. 
106. Id. 
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rational effort to deal with concerns about fraud.107 Rather, the Court 
explained that the “practical effect” of the challenged classification 
“simply does not operate so as rationally to further the prevention of 
fraud,” and that “in practical operation, the . . . amendment excludes 
from participation in the food stamp program, not those persons who are 
‘likely to abuse the program,’ but rather only those who . . . cannot even 
afford to alter their living arrangements so as to retain their 
eligibility.”108 The majority did not even respond to Justice Rehnquist’s 
dissenting argument that “[t]he limitation which Congress enacted could, 
in the judgment of reasonable men, conceivably deny food stamps to 
members of households which have been formed solely for the purpose 
of taking advantage of the food stamp program.”109 Thus, for the 
majority, the test was whether the classification actually achieved its 
purpose. In contrast, the dissent used the traditional deferential mode of 
analysis and viewed the test as whether a reasonable person might have 
conceived that there was a correlation between classification and 
purpose. 
After the Court rejected as inadequate the correlation between the 
“unrelated household” classification and the alleged purpose of deterring 
fraud, the Court then determined that deterring fraud was not the actual 
purpose of the amendment after all. Although there was very little 
legislative history that would have identified the purpose of the 
amendment, the Court decided that the actual purpose was “to prevent 
[so-called] ‘hippies’ and ‘hippie communes’ from participating in the 
food stamp program.”110 That purpose, the Court explained in words that 
would be much cited, was not permissible: 
For if the constitutional conception of “equal protection of the 
laws” means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare 
congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group 
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest. As a result, 
“[a] purpose to discriminate against hippies cannot, in and of 
itself and without reference to [some independent] considerations 
in the public interest, justify the . . . amendment.”111 
The Moreno case is significant because the majority opinion followed 
a methodology for rational-basis review that was clearly more 
                                                     
107. Id. at 535–36. 
108. Id. at 537–38 (first emphasis added) (second emphasis in original). 
109. Id. at 547 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
110. Id. at 534 (citation omitted). 
111. Id. at 534–35 (alterations and emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 
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demanding than that traditionally required. In doing so, the majority 
rejected the dissent’s quite persuasive argument that the amendment 
would have survived the traditional version of rationality because it 
conceivably could have been viewed as an anti-fraud device. 
The second of the bedrock heightened rationality cases is City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. In that case, the city denied a 
special-use permit for the operation of a group home for the mentally 
disabled, and the Court concluded that the city’s action did not satisfy 
rational-basis review.112 In explaining why not, the Court did not 
hypothesize a permissible purpose nor did it imagine a conceivable 
connection between the classification and such a hypothesized purpose. 
Instead, the Court insisted on an actual correlation between the 
classification and the alleged purposes, and then it searched the record 
for evidence of such a correlation. The Court twice referred to the 
absence of any evidence in “the record” that would explain why, in 
relation to the legitimate concern with the size of a home and the number 
of occupants, the city treated this one group home (made up of the 
mentally disabled) differently from other group homes (such as those 
used as boarding houses, nursing homes, family dwellings, fraternity 
houses, or dormitories).113 The Court was demanding evidence in the 
record that the city was in fact “right” that the mentally disabled were 
different in relation to the purpose. Nowhere in the opinion does the 
Court ask whether there is any conceivable set of facts under which it 
might be appropriate to treat the mentally disabled differently from those 
who occupied other group homes. 
The Cleburne Court rejected a number of hypothetical permissible 
purposes as implausible, because the mentally disabled were no different 
from any of the other, non-regulated groups in relation to those 
purposes.114 The Court then assessed the city’s actual purpose in denying 
the permit: “The short of it is that requiring the permit in this case 
appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the mentally 
retarded.”115 This, as the Court made clear, was not a permissible 
                                                     
112. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 431, 431, 446–50. 
113. Id. at 448 (“Because in our view the record does not reveal any rational basis for believing 
that the Featherston home would pose any special threat to the city’s legitimate interests, we affirm 
the judgment below insofar as it holds the ordinance invalid as applied in this case.” (emphasis 
added)); id. at 450 (“At least this record does not clarify how, in this connection, the characteristics 
of the intended occupants of the Featherston home rationally justify denying to those occupants 
what would be permitted to groups occupying the same site for different purposes.” (emphasis 
added)). 
114. Id. at 448–50. 
115. Id. at 450. 
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purpose, for some “objectives—such as ‘a bare . . . desire to harm a 
politically unpopular group,’— are not legitimate state interests.”116 That 
is, “mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are 
properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases 
for treating a home for the mentally retarded differently from apartment 
houses, multiple dwellings, and the like,”117 and “[p]rivate biases may be 
outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, 
give them effect.”118 
The last of the trio of paradigmatic heightened rationality cases is 
Romer v. Evans. In Romer, the Court considered an amendment to the 
Colorado Constitution that prohibited state and local governments from 
enacting statutes or ordinances that prohibited discrimination on the 
basis of homosexuality.119 As the majority opinion in Romer explained, 
“[t]he amendment withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific 
legal protection from the injuries caused by discrimination, and it forbids 
reinstatement of these laws and policies.”120 
The State asserted that the amendment served three state interests—
“that it put gays and lesbians in the same position as all other 
persons”;121 that it respected freedom of association, particularly “the 
liberties of landlords or employers who have personal or religious 
objections to homosexuality . . .”; and that it conserved resources “to 
fight discrimination against other groups.”122 The Court was unwilling to 
accept the State’s assertions that these were the purposes of the 
amendment, calling them “implausible”123 and “impossible to credit.”124 
Nor did the Court make any attempt to hypothesize a permissible 
purpose. Instead, focusing on the “sheer breadth”125 of the amendment 
(in terms of the substantial number of statutes, ordinances, and state 
regulations and practices it affected) along with the fact that the 
amendment directed its adverse consequences at a very specific group, 
the Court found that the amendment was “inexplicable by anything but 
                                                     
116. Id. at 446–47 (citation omitted) (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534). 
117. Id. at 448. 
118. Id. (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)). 
119. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996). 
120. Id. at 627. 
121. Id. at 626. 
122. Id. at 635. 
123. Id. at 626. 
124. Id. at 635. 
125. Id. at 632. 
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animus toward the class it affects.”126 In addition, the amendment raised 
“the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of 
animosity toward the class of persons affected,”127and it classified gay 
persons “not to further a proper legislative end but to make them 
unequal to everyone else”128 and “stranger[s] to its laws.”129 The Court 
explained equal protection’s basic limit on governmental purpose—“that 
classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group 
burdened by the law.”130 Instead, laws must be justified “by reference to 
legitimate public policies which justify the incidental disadvantages they 
impose on certain persons.”131 
Although heightened rationality is the exception rather than the rule, 
there are certainly other examples beyond the three just mentioned. In 
Zobel v. Williams,132 the Court used rational-basis review to invalidate 
an Alaska statute that would have provided for the distribution of 
income from the state’s oil fund on the basis of years of residency in 
Alaska.133 The Court first found that the years-of-residency classification 
was not in fact adequately correlated with the permissible purposes of 
the statute.134 The Court never asked whether a reasonable legislator 
might have believed that there was an adequate correlation between 
classification and purpose. Further, the Court found that the state’s third 
asserted purpose—rewarding citizens for past contributions—was not a 
legitimate state purpose.135 The Court concluded that “[t]he only 
apparent justification for the retrospective aspect of the program, 
‘favoring established residents over new residents,’ is constitutionally 
unacceptable.”136 
                                                     
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 634. 
128. Id. at 635. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 633 (citation omitted). 
131. Id. at 635. 
132. 457 U.S. 55 (1982). 
133. Id. at 57. 
134. The first two purposes identified by the statute were (1) creating a financial incentive for 
individuals to establish and maintain Alaska residence; and (2) assuring prudent management of the 
Permanent Fund. The Court assumed that these were permissible, but concluded that the “years of 
residency” classification, with retroactive credit for years lived in Alaska before the statute was 
enacted, could not in fact rationally advance the stated purposes. Id. at 61–63. 
135. Id. at 63. 
136. Id. at 65 (citation omitted). 
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Eisenstadt v. Baird137 is another example. There, the Court invalidated 
a statute that prohibited the sale of contraceptives to unmarried 
persons.138 The Court looked carefully for evidence of the actual purpose 
of the law and found that the purposes identified by the courts below 
were implausible.139 The Court then considered whether the statute’s 
purpose could be identified as equivalent to its effect—preventing the 
use of contraceptives.140 
Assuming that prohibiting the use of contraceptives was both a 
permissible purpose and the actual purpose of the statute, the Court 
determined that the statutory classification that prohibited only 
unmarried persons from using contraceptives was not adequately 
correlated with that purpose. The Court explained that married and 
unmarried persons were similarly situated in relation to that purpose.141 
For the Court, this problem of under-inclusion was decisive because the 
                                                     
137. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
138. Id. at 440–41. This case, involving a challenge to a statute that prohibited the sale of 
contraceptives to unmarried persons could have been decided under a strict-scrutiny standard, as the 
law appeared to infringe on the fundamental right to privacy protected under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The Court, however, deciding the case after Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), but before Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), did not consider it 
necessary to address the statute’s validity under the compelling-interest test because the statute 
“fail[ed] to satisfy even the more lenient [rational basis] equal protection standard.” Eisenstadt, 405 
U.S. at 447 n.7.  
139. A state court had found that the purpose of the law was to prevent premarital sex. Eisenstadt, 
405 U.S. at 448 (citing Sturgis v. Att’y Gen., 260 N.E.2d 687 (1970)). The U.S. Supreme Court 
responded by insisting that “we cannot agree that the deterrence of premarital sex may reasonably 
be regarded as the purpose of the Massachusetts law.” Id. This could not be the purpose, explained 
the Court, first, because “[i]t would be plainly unreasonable to assume that Massachusetts has 
prescribed pregnancy and birth of an unwanted child as punishment for fornication,” and second, 
because the statute was so riddled with exceptions—contraceptives were not regulated when used 
for the prevention of disease, and the statute made no attempt to deter married persons from 
engaging in sexual relations with unmarried persons—that “deterrence of premarital sex cannot 
reasonably be regarded as its aim.” Id. at 449. A second proffered justification for the ban on 
contraceptives was that it advanced certain state health objectives. Id at 450. Once again, the Court 
closely scrutinized this alleged purpose and found the argument in its favor to be illogical because it 
was overbroad and discriminatory. The alleged health purpose was overbroad in that some 
contraceptives were not hazardous to health. Id. at 451. It was discriminatory in that, if health 
concerns were in fact the underlying purpose, then it was not rational that the statute allowed 
physicians to prescribe contraceptives to married but not unmarried persons, because health 
concerns would be the same for married and unmarried persons. Id. at 450–51. As a result of this 
failure in logic, the Court concluded that health could not reasonably be regarded as the purpose of 
the statute. 
140. Id. at 452–53. 
141. Id. at 453–54 (citations omitted). 
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guaranty of equal protection means “that the principles of law which 
officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally.”142 
The Eisenstadt opinion, although it claimed to be applying rational-
basis review, in fact applied a standard much more demanding than that 
of traditional deferential rationality. With regard to the identification of 
purpose, the Court refused to accept the first two purposes identified by 
state officials, but instead carefully examined the logic associated with 
the argument for the first two purposes and found that logic wanting.143 
With regard to the third purpose, the Court did not ask whether the state 
might conceivably have thought that there was a connection between a 
person’s marital status and the prohibition of contraception, but instead 
found that underinclusion was a fatal flaw in the statute and insisted that 
the state treat all persons the same in relation to the prohibition of 
contraceptives.144 The Court in Eisenstadt never attempted to 
hypothesize additional permissible purposes or ask whether the 
Massachusetts Legislature might conceivably have believed that banning 
contraceptives might diminish premarital sex and promote health 
objectives. These are the questions that the Court would have asked if it 
had been applying traditional deferential rationality. 
The cases discussed illustrate the Court’s use of the demanding 
version of rational-basis review. Although such cases are the exception 
rather than the norm, they are sufficiently frequent to have drawn notice 
and study over a long period of time.145 
                                                     
142. Id. at 454 (quoting Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) 
(Jackson, J., concurring)). 
143. See supra note 139. 
144. See supra notes 141–42 and accompanying text. 
145. Gerald Gunther, in an influential law review article published in 1972, identified seven cases 
from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1971 term in which equal protection arguments were successful 
even though the Court appeared to be applying a minimal-scrutiny standard. Gerald Gunther, The 
Supreme Court 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A 
Newer Model for Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). A subsequent study reported that 
during the period beginning after the publication of the Gunther article and ending with the Court’s 
1996 decision in Romer v. Evans, the Court decided 110 equal protection rational-basis cases and 
plaintiffs prevailed in ten. Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court 
from the 1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357 (1999). In 2000, the U.S. 
Supreme Court created the “class of one” equal protection claim, a kind of rational-basis claim that 
was successful in its first application. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). 
Further, even in those hoary old days during the first three decades of the twentieth century, a time 
during which Justice Holmes characterized equal protection claims as “the usual last resort of 
constitutional arguments,” Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927), the Court decided at least three 
successful rational-basis cases. See Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32 (1928); 
F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920); Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 
U.S. 540 (1902). 
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C. How Does the Court Decide Which Version of Rationality Review 
to Use? 
Given the two different versions of rationality review, it would 
enhance predictability if the U.S. Supreme Court would explain when 
the deferential version is appropriate and when the more demanding 
version should be used. However, the Court has provided no such 
guidance, in word or deed. The most obvious explanation for heightened 
rationality is that the heightened standard is appropriate where the 
classification involves a class that is closely analogous to those classes 
which the Court has found to be suspect or quasi-suspect.146 This is an 
appealing explanation, but it does not work. First, the Court itself has 
rejected this explanation. In Cleburne, the Court explicitly rejected the 
idea that the mentally disabled should be entitled to heightened 
scrutiny,147 and in Romer, the Court completely ignored the idea that 
gays might be a suspect class. Further, if quasi-suspect status were the 
explanation for the Court’s use of heightened scrutiny, there would be 
the problem of consistency. Why, for example, did the Court apply a 
heightened rationality to the mentally disabled in Cleburne but not to the 
mentally disabled in Heller? Why did the Court apply heightened 
rationality to gays in Romer but let stand lower court decisions that 
applied a deferential standard to laws disadvantaging gays?148 
An alternative explanation would suggest that heightened rationality 
is appropriate when the government benefit sought is significant. This 
would explain why the Court used heightened rationality in Moreno, a 
case that involved food stamps, and Plyler v. Doe,149 a case that involved 
a claim to basic education. Once again, however, the problem of 
consistency remains. How would one then explain why the Court 
applied a very deferential version of rationality in other cases involving 
food stamps,150 welfare benefits,151 and education?152 There does not 
                                                     
146. The Court, for example, considers race a suspect classification and thus applies strict 
scrutiny to racial classifications. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 446 U.S. 429, 432–33 (1984). It also 
considers gender a quasi-suspect classification and applies intermediate scrutiny to gender 
classifications. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
147. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985). 
148. E.g., Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 948 (1996); 
Richenberg. v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 807 (1997); Beller v. 
Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981). 
149. 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
150. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986). 
151. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
152. San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
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seem to be any consistent principle that explains why the U.S. Supreme 
Court chooses one version of rationality in one case but not in another 
case with a very similar factual setting. 
III. SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS AND THE TWO VERSIONS OF 
RATIONALITY REVIEW 
The conflict between the two competing versions of rationality review 
has in recent years been most clearly evident in cases challenging 
longstanding government policies disadvantaging gays and lesbians. 
These cases principally involve three factual settings: state laws defining 
marriage as limited to a man and a woman, the U.S. military’s policy of 
excluding gays and lesbians from military service, and DOMA, which 
limits federal recognition of marriage to opposite-sex couples. In each of 
these contexts, the result of a constitutional challenge is typically 
determined by which version of rational-basis review a court employs. 
This Part examines the two versions of rational-basis review in these 
three settings. 
A. State Laws that Define Marriage as Being Limited to a Man and a 
Woman 
While no state has recognized same-sex marriage under its traditional 
marriage laws,153 in recent years state constitutions have been amended 
to make the affirmative assertion that only marriage between a man and 
a woman will be recognized.154 This section examines federal equal 
protection challenges to two of those state constitutional amendments. In 
the first case, the court used the traditional deferential version and in the 
second case, the more demanding version. 
In Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning,155 the Eighth Circuit 
considered an amendment to the Nebraska State Constitution that 
provided that “[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman shall be 
valid or recognized in Nebraska.”156 The court cited Heller and Beach 
Communications for the propositions that “a statutory classification that 
neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental 
                                                     
153. In 2006, “[t]he vast majority of states—forty-five to be exact—preserve[d] the traditional 
definition of marriage (as between a man and a woman) and/or prohibit[ed] same-sex marriage by 
statute.” J. Harvey Wilkinson III, Gay Rights And American Constitutionalism: What’s A 
Constitution For?, 56 DUKE L.J. 545, 568 (2006).  
154. See, e.g., infra notes 156, 165. 
155. 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006). 
156. Id. at 863 (quoting NEB. CONST., art. I, § 29). 
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constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if 
there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a 
rational-basis for the classification,”157and that the classification was to 
be afforded “a strong presumption of validity.”158 The State, defending 
the provision, argued that the government interest that supported this 
provision was “steering procreation into marriage.”159 Because the 
provision was enacted by referendum, there was no formal legislative 
history that could indicate the purpose of the law. The court cited no 
evidence as to the purpose of the enactment but simply accepted the 
post-hoc rationalization put forward by the State in defending the case. 
The court explained the connection between the classification and this 
purpose: 
By affording legal recognition and a basket of rights and 
benefits to married heterosexual couples, such laws “encourage 
procreation to take place within the socially recognized unit that 
is best situated for raising children.” The State and its supporting 
amici cite a host of judicial decisions and secondary authorities 
recognizing and upholding this rationale. The argument is based 
in part on the traditional notion that two committed 
heterosexuals are the optimal partnership for raising children, 
which modern-day homosexual parents understandably decry. 
But it is also based on a “responsible procreation” theory that 
justifies conferring the inducements of marital recognition and 
benefits on opposite-sex couples, who can otherwise produce 
children by accident, but not on same-sex couples, who 
cannot.160 
This may seem like an odd justification for heterosexual marriage—that 
a heterosexual couple can produce children “by accident.” But it was 
enough given the deference accorded to the government by the court in 
this case. 
The challengers to the law, on the other hand, questioned whether the 
amendment as written actually advanced the State’s purpose of steering 
procreation into marriage. As of matter of logic, they argued, keeping 
gay people out of marriage was not likely to steer heterosexual persons 
                                                     
157. Id. at 867 (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
158. Id. at 867 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
159. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
160. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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into procreative marriages.161 The court, however, restated the purpose 
of traditional marriage laws: “to encourage heterosexual couples to bear 
and raise children in committed marriage relationships.”162 In response 
to the argument that this last justification seemed to be based on 
prejudice against same-sex couples, the court explained that the 
amendment only “limits the class of people who may validly enter into 
marriage” and thus is not “‘inexplicable by anything but animus’ 
towards same-sex couples.”163 
The Bruning court’s decision is a classic version of deferential 
rationality. The court was not concerned with evidence of the actual 
purpose of the statute, it was not concerned with whether the statutory 
classification actually advanced a statutory purpose, and it easily 
rejected the argument that the enactment of the statute was motivated by 
prejudice against same-sex couples. 
On the other hand, in Perry v. Schwarzenegger,164 a district court in 
California considered a similar amendment to the California Constitution 
and used the more demanding version of rational-basis review, 
invalidating the amendment. In California, the voters approved 
Proposition 8, which amended the state constitution to provide that 
“[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in 
California.”165 The Perry decision was based on two grounds. The first 
was that Proposition 8 infringed on the implied fundamental right to 
marry and that the state could not justify that infringement under the 
strict-scrutiny standard.166 The second ground was that Proposition 8 
could not even satisfy equal protection’s deferential rational-basis 
standard.167 This section examines the rational basis portion of the Perry 
decision. 
In its discussion of that rational-basis standard, the Perry court cited 
the three U.S. Supreme Court precedents that would most strongly 
support invalidation of Proposition 8—(1) United States Department of 
                                                     
161. Id. at 868. 
162. Id. (emphasis added). 
163. Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996)). 
164. 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), appeal docketed, No. 10-16696 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 
2010). 
165. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5. This constitutional amendment was added by an initiative measure 
known as “Proposition 8.” This constitutional amendment effectively reversed an earlier decision of 
the Supreme Court of California, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), that had found 
that the California Constitution’s equal protection clause required the state to recognize same-sex 
marriage. 
166. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 991–96. 
167. Id. at 996–1003. 
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Agriculture v. Moreno, for the proposition that “a law must do more than 
disadvantage or otherwise harm a particular group,”168 (2) City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, for the proposition that 
“[l]egislation singling out a class of human beings for differential 
treatment hinges upon a demonstration of ‘real and undeniable 
differences’ between the class and others,”169 and (3) Romer v. Evans, 
for the proposition that the search for a rational basis “ensure[s] that 
classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group 
burdened by the law.”170 In addition, the Perry court cited Plyler v. Doe 
for the proposition that “[t]he court may look to evidence to determine 
whether the basis for the underlying debate is rational.”171 
The Perry court also cited as purported supporting precedents (1) 
Heller v. Doe, for the general proposition that “the court presumes the 
law is valid and will uphold it as long as it is rationally related to some 
legitimate governmental interest”;172 (2) Minnesota v. Clover Leaf 
Creamery Co., for the proposition that “[t]he court defers to the 
legislative . . . judgment if there is at least a debatable question whether 
the underlying basis for classification is rational”;173 and (3) 
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,174 as support for the 
assertion that “gays and lesbians are the type of minority strict scrutiny 
was designed to protect.”175 
Nowhere in the Perry opinion is there any recognition that these last 
three U.S. Supreme Court cases, far from supporting the Perry holding, 
directly undermine it and need to be distinguished or otherwise avoided. 
In Heller, the Court had insisted that the plaintiff’s rational-basis burden 
in attacking the legislative judgment was “to negative every conceivable 
basis which might support it.”176 Further, under the Heller standard, the 
legislature “need not ‘actually articulate at any time the purpose or 
rationale supporting its classification’” which “must be upheld . . . if 
                                                     
168. Id. at 996. 
169. Id. at 997. 
170. Id. at 995 (alteration in original) (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
171. Id. (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 228 (1982) (“[T]he available evidence suggests that 
illegal aliens underutilize public services, while contributing their labor to the local economy and 
tax money to the state fisc.”)).   
172. Id. (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319–20 (1993)). 
173. Id. (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981)). 
174. 427 U.S. 307 (1976). 
175. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 997 (citing Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313). 
176. Heller, 509 U.S. at 320 (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 
364 (1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
05 - 051911 Farrell Post Author Final Read.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/21/2011  7:39 PM 
310 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:281 
 
there is any reasonably conceivable set of facts that could provide a 
rational basis for the classification.”177 Furthermore, a state is under “no 
obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory 
classification,” which “may be based on rational speculation 
unsupported by evidence or empirical data.”178 Nor did the Perry court 
acknowledge the precedential problems of Clover Leaf, which had 
declared that “[w]here there was evidence before the legislature 
reasonably supporting the classification, litigants may not procure 
invalidation of the legislation merely by tendering evidence in court that 
the legislature was mistaken.”179 Nor did the Perry court acknowledge 
that, under Murgia, the adverse and unfair impact of a law on an 
individual person is not of constitutional weight so long there was a 
rational basis for the generalization embodied in the classification.180 
Instead of addressing these problematic cases head on, the Perry court 
ignored their admonishments and, in contravention of their holdings, 
closely examined the evidence in the record, looking for the purpose and 
the relation between classification and purpose. The court evaluated each 
of the six purposes set forth by the proponents of Proposition 8. The first 
interest asserted was the preservation of the traditional institution of 
marriage as the union of a man and a woman.181 The Perry court rejected 
this interest on the ground that “[t]radition alone . . . cannot form a 
rational basis for a law,” and that “[t]he ‘ancient lineage’ of a 
classification does not make it rational.”182 In its disparagement of 
tradition as a proper justification, the court noted how another marriage 
tradition—the tradition of assigning legally mandated gender roles to 
husband and wife—also enjoyed longstanding support.183 Those 
traditional roles, however, have since been rejected by the courts as 
unconstitutional, “nothing more than an artifact of a forgone notion that 
men and women fulfill different roles in civic life.”184 The court also 
                                                     
177. Id. at 320 (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
178. Id. (quoting Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 315) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
179. Clover Leaf, 449 U.S. at 464. 
180. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 311, 314 (upholding as rational an age classification that required a 
police officer to retire at age fifty even though he himself was fit and capable of performing the 
duties of a police officer). 
181. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 998 (N.D. Cal. 2010), appeal docketed, No. 
10-16696 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 2010). 
182. Id. (citing Heller, 509 U.S. at 327). 
183. Id. at 958–59, 998. 
184. Id. at 998. 
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noted that the asserted interests in tradition are “nothing more than 
tautologies and do not to amount rational bases for Proposition 8.”185 
The comment about tautologies is substantially correct, at least if one 
frames the nature of the tradition narrowly. That would mean that the 
purpose of an amendment that limits marriage to a man and a woman is 
to limit marriage to a man and a woman. There is, however, a broader 
statement of the argument to tradition that is not tautological and has 
been given greater weight in other U.S. Supreme Court decisions. This 
argument sees tradition as respect for the customary ways things have 
been done because the survival of a particular practice over a long period 
of time suggests that there is real value in that practice. 
In the U.S. Supreme Court, the appeal to tradition as a significant 
value that can justify legislation has far more support than the Perry 
court suggests. The appeal to tradition is strongest in the Court’s 
substantive due process cases where one of the tests for determining 
whether or not an implied right is fundamental is whether the practice is 
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”186 Although the 
Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court disagree on the application of the 
history and traditions test and on the level of generality at which it is to 
be applied,187 there is substantial agreement that history and tradition are 
at least an important starting point for determining what rights are 
fundamental.188 As Justice Scalia explained, the protection of 
traditionally protected interests is important in order “to prevent future 
generations from lightly casting aside important traditional values.”189 In 
Washington v. Glucksberg,190 a case in which the Court considered the 
claim that a statute banning assisted suicide violated the Due Process 
Clause, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, said, “We begin, 
as we do in all due process cases, by examining our Nation’s history, 
legal traditions, and practices.”191 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
the history and traditions method reins in subjective elements of judicial 
                                                     
185. Id. 
186. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). 
187. See Robert C. Farrell, An Excess of Methods: Identifying Implied Fundamental Rights in the 
Supreme Court, 26 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 203, 225–35 (2007). 
188. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (“[H]istory and tradition are the starting point 
but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.” (alteration in original) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
189. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123 n.2 (1989). 
190. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
191. Id. at 710. 
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review because it is “carefully refined by concrete examples involving 
fundamental rights found to be deeply rooted in our legal tradition.”192 
Even apart from the substantive due process cases, the Court has 
emphasized the value of tradition in rational basis equal protection cases 
as well. Thus, in City of New Orleans v. Dukes,193 the Court considered 
the validity of a local ordinance that banned pushcart vendors from the 
French Quarter section of the city but exempted pushcarts that had been 
operating for eight or more years.194 The court of appeals had invalidated 
the ordinance on the ground that the grandfather clause did not ensure 
that the favored vendors would in fact preserve the traditions of the 
Quarter.195 In doing so, the court assumed that preserving that tradition 
was in fact a valid interest. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the 
ordinance as rationally related to the valid purpose of “preserv[ing] the 
appearance and custom valued by the Quarter’s residents and attractive 
to tourists. The legitimacy of that objective is obvious.”196 Further, in 
Nordlinger v. Hahn, the U.S. Supreme Court in a rational-basis case 
identified “local neighborhood preservation, continuity, and stability,”197 
as permissible purposes that would justify a taxing scheme that gave a 
substantial preference to long-term homeowners over newcomers. Thus, 
the Perry court’s quick and complete rejection of tradition as a 
justification for Proposition 8 was inconsistent both with the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s deferential rational-basis cases and also with its cases 
that pay accolades to the value of tradition. 
The proponents of Proposition 8 next asserted that the amendment 
was related to the state’s interest in “[a]cting incrementally and with 
caution when considering a radical transformation to the fundamental 
nature of a bedrock social institution.”198 The court rejected this interest 
on the ground that “evidence at the trial” rebutted the claim that 
marriage amounted to a sweeping social change, and that the contrary 
evidence of proponents was neither credible nor reliable.199 The court 
concluded that “[b]ecause the evidence shows that same-sex marriage 
                                                     
192. Id. at 722. 
193. 427 U.S. 297 (1976). 
194. Id. at 298. 
195. Id. at 300. 
196. Id. at 304 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
197. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 12 (1992) (citing Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 
U.S. 365 (1926)). 
198. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 998–99 (N.D. Cal. 2010), appeal docketed, 
No. 10-16696 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 2010) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
199. Id. at 999. 
05 - 051911 Farrell Post Author Final Read.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/21/2011  7:39 PM 
2011] TWO VERSIONS OF RATIONAL-BASIS REVIEW 313 
 
has and will have no adverse effects on society or the institution of 
marriage, California has no interest in waiting and no practical need to 
wait to grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples.”200 In drawing this 
conclusion, the court ignored two foundations of traditional deferential 
rational-basis review. First, the court’s emphasis on what “the evidence” 
showed is misplaced. In traditional rational-basis cases, the state need 
not produce any evidence either of the purpose of a law or of any actual 
connection between the law’s classification and its purpose.201 The 
evidence is irrelevant. 
Second, the argument in favor of gradualism, incrementalism, and 
caution has substantial support in the U.S. Supreme Court’s rational-
basis precedents. In Williamson v. Lee Optical,202 for example, the 
Court, considering an equal protection challenge to law that advantaged 
ophthalmologists and optometrists over opticians, explained: 
Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and 
proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature 
may think. Or the reform may take one step at a time, addressing 
itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the 
legislative mind. The legislature may select one phase of one 
field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others. The 
prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no further than 
the invidious discrimination.203 
This one-step-at-a-time standard is very deferential because, once a court 
has upheld a piece of legislation on that basis, a court does not follow up 
to ensure that the state ever takes a second step to address the 
problem.204 Thus, the effect of the Court’s approval of step-at-a-time 
action is that a state is always free to address only a part of a problem. 
This is what the proponents of Proposition 8 argued the state was doing 
because it had adopted a domestic partnership law that allowed same-sex 
couples to receive many of the rights and benefits accorded to married 
couples.205 
City of New Orleans v. Dukes provides further support for the policy 
of gradualism. When explaining why, consistent with the Equal 
Protection Clause, the city could exclude some pushcart vendors from 
                                                     
200. Id. 
201. See supra Part II.A. 
202. 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
203. Id. at 489 (citations omitted). 
204. See Note, Reforming the One Step at a Time Justification in Equal Protection Cases, 90 
YALE L.J. 1777, 1779–80 (1981). 
205. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 994. 
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the French Quarter while allowing others to stay, the Court said: “We 
are guided by the familiar principles that a ‘statute is not invalid under 
the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did,’ that a 
legislature need not ‘strike at all evils at the same time.’”206 It is thus 
clear that, under rational-basis review, it is permissible for the state to 
proceed gradually and perhaps cautiously. A court applying the 
deferential version of rational-basis review would likely have found this 
to be a valid interest. 
The proponents of Proposition 8 next asserted a third interest: the 
promotion of “stability and responsibility in naturally procreative 
relationships.”207 The court rejected this interest because “the evidence” 
was inconsistent with this purpose in that “same-sex parents and 
opposite-sex parents are of equal quality.”208 Further, Proposition 8 
“does not make it more likely that opposite-sex couples will marry and 
raise off-spring biologically related to both parents.”209 
The court’s analysis here is inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s deferential rational-basis precedents in two ways. Again, the 
trial court’s stress on weighing “the evidence” conflicts with the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s insistence, in its deferential rational-basis cases, that 
the evidence does not matter at all.210 Further, the Court in Nordlinger 
explicitly identified stability as a valid purpose for a state to pursue.211 
Given that purpose, all that matters is that the proponents of Proposition 
8 might conceivably have believed that there is a connection between 
traditional marriage rules and stability and procreation. To the extent 
that the district court cited “the evidence” that Proposition 8 would in 
fact discourage a norm that “sexual activity occur within a marriage to 
ensure that reproduction occur within stable households,”212 and was 
thus was not related to the purpose of the law, that finding is not relevant 
to traditional deferential rational-basis review. All that is required is that 
proponents of the law could reasonably have believed that there is some 
connection between opposite-sex couples and procreation in marriage 
and that opposite-sex couples might have more stable marriages than 
                                                     
206. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 305 (1976) (citations omitted) (quoting 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 657 (1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
207. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 999 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
208. Id. 
209. Id. at 999–1000. 
210. See supra notes 75–100 and accompanying text. 
211. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1992). 
212. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1000. 
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same-sex couples. Under traditional deferential review, this would be an 
adequate justification for the law, even if it is not true. 
The Perry court quickly rejected the proponents’ fourth asserted 
purpose—protecting the religious freedom of those who oppose 
marriage for same-sex couples, because the amendment did “not affect 
any First Amendment right or the responsibility of parents to educate 
their children.”213 The court moved from the alleged religious objection 
to the statute to an evaluation of the statute’s asserted fifth purpose—
treating same-sex couples differently from opposite-sex couples.214 The 
court found that “[t]he evidence shows conclusively that moral and 
religious beliefs form the only basis for a belief that same-sex couples 
are different from opposite sex couples,” but the court went on to write 
that “[t]he evidence fatally undermines any purported state interest in 
treating couples differently.”215 The court’s rejection of religious belief 
as a proper motivation of Proposition 8 is certainly correct in that, under 
the First Amendment, the state is required to advance only secular 
purposes. The court’s rejection of the moral attitudes, however, is much 
more problematic. 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Lawrence v. Texas is the 
starting point for a discussion of morality as a legitimate interest that can 
justify classifications. In that case, the majority quoted approvingly from 
Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick:216 “[T]he 
fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a 
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a 
law prohibiting the practice.”217 The Lawrence majority then declared 
that “[m]oral disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate governmental 
interest under the Equal Protection Clause because legal classifications 
must not be ‘drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group 
burdened by the law.’”218 Some courts have interpreted this language in 
Lawrence as meaning that the promotion of morality can never 
constitute a legitimate purpose to justify a governmental classification.219 
                                                     
213. Id. 
214. Id. at 1001. 
215. Id. 
216. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
217. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 216 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting)). 
218. Id. at 583 (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996)). 
219. E.g., Reliable Consultants v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008). In this case, the Fifth 
Circuit reviewed a statute that prohibited the sale of sexual devices and concluded that it violated 
the constitutional right “to engage in private intimate conduct in the home without government 
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Other courts read that language more narrowly so that the promotion 
of morality through legislation, a longstanding practice, remains an 
appropriate state interest in certain contexts. In terms of the longstanding 
nature of the practice, a number of U.S. Supreme Court cases upheld 
obscenity statutes,220 reasoning that protecting “the social interest in 
order and morality” was a legitimate state interest justifying these 
statutes.221 In Williams v. Morgan,222 the Eleventh Circuit upheld a state 
statute that prohibited the commercial distribution of certain sexual 
devices. In the court’s final opinion in that case, the only question 
remaining was “whether public morality remains a sufficient rational 
basis for the challenged statute” after Lawrence.223 The court 
distinguished Lawrence as follows: 
However, while the statute at issue in Lawrence criminalized 
private sexual conduct, the statute at issue in this case forbids 
public, commercial activity. To the extent Lawrence rejects 
public morality as a legitimate government interest, it 
invalidates only those laws that target conduct that is both 
private and non-commercial.224 
The court upheld the challenged statute because it “target[ed] commerce 
in sexual devices, an inherently public activity.”225 The court explained 
further that it did not read Lawrence as having “rendered public morality 
altogether illegitimate as a rational basis.”226 Other federal courts have 
                                                     
intrusion.” Id. at 743. The state’s primary justifications for the statute were “morality based.” Id. at 
745. The court rejected those justifications: 
These interests in “public morality” cannot constitutionally sustain the statute after 
Lawrence. To uphold the statute would be to ignore the holding in Lawrence and allow the 
government to burden consensual private intimate conduct simply by deeming it morally 
offensive. In Lawrence, Texas’s only argument was that the anti-sodomy law reflected the 
moral judgment of the legislature. The Court expressly rejected the State’s rationale by 
adopting Justice Stevens’ view in Bowers as “controlling” and quoting Justice Stevens’ 
statement that “‘the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a 
particular practice as immoral is Lawrence not a sufficient reason for upholding a law 
prohibiting the practice.’” Thus, if in Lawrence public morality was an insufficient justification 
for a law that restricted “adult consensual intimacy in the home,” then public morality also 
cannot serve as a rational basis for Texas’s statute, which also regulates private sexual 
intimacy. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
220. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 
49 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
221. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568, 571–72 (1942)). 
222. 478 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2007). 
223. Id. at 1318. 
224. Id. at 1322 (emphasis in original) (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)). 
225. Id. 
226. Id. at 1323 (emphasis in original). 
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agreed that the promotion of morality is still a sufficient justification for 
the state to regulate public conduct.227 
Thus, even after Lawrence, the promotion of morality can be a 
legitimate state interest, at least in the proper context. Is Proposition 8 
such a proper context? Although Lawrence makes clear that public 
morality does not justify state intrusion on private conduct, Proposition 8 
makes no attempt to regulate private sexual conduct. It simply withholds 
public recognition and public endorsement of same-sex relationships by 
denying the right to a publicly recognized marriage. Public morality is 
arguably a legitimate state interest to justify that denial. 
The Perry court briefly referred to and rejected the sixth asserted 
interest supporting Proposition 8—“the catchall interest.”228 In the very 
last portion of its rational-basis discussion, the court finally arrived at the 
argument that most broadly supports its invalidation of Proposition 8—
that its actual purpose is to discriminate against gay persons.229 This 
focus on the actual purpose of a statute is certainly not part of the 
methodology of deferential rational-basis review but is an essential part 
of heightened rationality.230 However, the Perry court, following the 
United States Supreme Court, made no mention of this distinction. The 
court did note that: 
In the absence of a rational basis, what remains of proponents’ 
case is an inference, amply supported by evidence in the record, 
that Proposition 8 was premised on the belief that same-sex 
couples simply are not as good as opposite-sex couples. Whether 
that belief is based on moral disapproval of homosexuality, 
animus towards gays and lesbians or simply a belief that a 
                                                     
227. See, e.g., United States v. Stagliano, 693 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2010). In Stagliano, the 
court declared:  
Furthermore, to the extent that Lawrence rejects public morality as a legitimate governmental 
interest, it does so only in the narrow context of private conduct that has no potential to harm 
others . . . . The Lawrence Court made clear that its holding did not extend to cases that 
“involve public conduct” . . . . The obscenity statutes, unlike the statute invalidated in 
Lawrence, do not target purely private activity. To the contrary, they target the public 
dissemination or the possession for sale of obscene materials. Although public morality may be 
an insufficient justification for regulating private conduct in some cases, it is certainly a 
sufficient justification for regulating the sort of public conduct at issue here. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld obscenity statutes on the basis that the government can 
“legitimately act . . . to protect ‘the social interest in order and morality.’”  
Id. at 38 (citations omitted). 
228. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1001–02 (N.D. Cal. 2010), appeal docketed, 
No. 10-16696 (9th Cir. Aug. 8, 2010). The court identified the “catchall interest” as “[a]ny other 
conceivable legitimate interests identified by the parties, amici, or the court at any stage of the 
proceedings.” Id. at 1001. 
229. Id. at 1002.  
230. See supra Parts II.A–B. 
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relationship between a man and a woman is inherently better 
than a relationship between two men or two women, this belief 
is not a proper basis on which to legislate.231 
The court went on to note that Proposition 8 was based on “a desire to 
advance the belief that opposite-sex couples are morally superior to 
same-sex couples” and on “negative stereotypes about gays and 
lesbians.”232 
This final, eloquent argument against Proposition 8 is a classic 
example of heightened rationality, with its rejection of the government’s 
asserted purposes as implausible and its focus on the actual purpose of 
the law, including a willingness to rule out animus or prejudice as 
permissible purposes. The Perry case will be upheld on appeal if the 
reviewing courts are willing to adopt this version of rational-basis 
review. The Perry opinion, however, in line with the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s own practice in this area, ignored rather than confronted the 
deferential version of rationality review. The U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions adopting the deferential version cannot readily be 
distinguished away and thus the result on appeal will depend on which 
set of precedents the reviewing court decides to apply. 
B. Gays in the Military 
In December 2010, Congress ended the longstanding policy of the 
United States military that prohibited gays and lesbians from serving in 
the military on the same terms as heterosexual persons.233 This statutory 
change effectively ended many years of litigation over the 
constitutionality of a changing series of military policies that excluded 
openly gay persons from service. Even though the cases decided under 
the old policies are now effectively moot, they still provide a good 
example of how courts grapple with the two versions of the rational-
basis standard. 
The United States military’s longstanding policy of excluding gay 
persons from military service has changed over time,234 but the military 
                                                     
231. Id. 
232. Id. at 1002–03 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (“[L]aws of the kind now 
before us raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward 
the class of persons affected.”)). 
233. See Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515. 
234. An early version provided that one “who solicits, attempts or engages in homosexual acts 
shall normally be separated from the naval service,” but discharge was not invariably mandatory. 
See Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1984). A subsequent version excluded “a 
person who has committed homosexual acts or is an admitted homosexual but as to whom there is 
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consistently refused to allow gays to serve openly in the military. 
Constitutional challenges that sought heightened scrutiny on the ground 
that the policy either violated substantive due process by infringing on a 
fundamental right or violated the Equal Protection Clause by 
discriminating against a suspect class, have been, until recently, 
unsuccessful.235 
Given this background, it is not surprising that challenges to the 
military’s exclusion of gays on the basis of equal protection’s rational-
basis test have not been successful either. The lower federal courts that 
have considered this issue have applied a deferential version of rational-
basis review,236 with its very generous willingness to accept the 
government’s version of the regulation’s purpose and little examination 
of whether the exclusion of gays actually serves the military’s alleged 
purposes. When federal courts considered the rationality of excluding 
gays from the military, not only were challenges to the policy 
unsuccessful, they were not even considered to be serious. Judge Bork’s 
opinion in Dronenburg v. Zech237 is a good illustration of the courts’ 
resistance to the arguments of same-sex military claimants. Addressing 
the question of whether the exclusion of gays from the military was a 
rational means of advancing a legitimate interest, Judge Bork explained: 
                                                     
no evidence that they have engaged in homosexual acts.” See Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 
1336 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Army Regulation 601-280), opinion withdrawn on reh’g, 875 F.2d 699 
(9th Cir. 1989). The most recent version of the rule, commonly known as the “Don’t Ask, Don’t 
Tell” policy, provided that a member of the armed forces will be discharged if any one of the 
following findings is made: (1) “That the member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or 
solicited another to engage in a homosexual act or acts . . .”; (2) “That the member has stated that he 
or she is a homosexual . . . unless there is a further finding . . . that the member has demonstrated 
that he or she is not a person who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, 
or intends to engage in homosexual acts”; or (3) “That the member has married or attempted to 
marry a person known to be of the same biological sex.” 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2006). 
235. With regard to substantive due process, the federal cases decided before Lawrence v. Texas 
uniformly rejected substantive due process challenges to the military’s regulations because no 
protected conduct was implicated by the military regulations and thus the regulations satisfied a 
minimal scrutiny standard. See, e.g., Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 260–62 (8th Cir. 1996); 
Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 934 (4th Cir. 1996); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1397–
98 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 812 (9th Cir. 1980). An alternative 
argument for heightened scrutiny of the military’s policy—that gays are a suspect class—has, with 
one exception, been uniformly rejected in the federal courts. Even that one exception itself was 
short-lived. A three-judge panel for the Ninth Circuit concluded that gays were a suspect class and 
invalidated the military regulations that exclude gays using a strict-scrutiny standard. Watkins v. 
U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988). This holding, however, was the law of the circuit for 
only fifteen months, at the end of which the circuit judges sitting en banc withdrew the decision of 
the three-judge panel. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989).  
236. See, e.g., Richenberg, 97 F.3d at 261–62; Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 927–31; Dronenburg, 741 
F.2d at 1397–98; Beller, 632 F.2d at 808–09 n.20. 
237. 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
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To ask the question is to answer it. The effects of homosexual 
conduct within a naval or military unit are almost certain to be 
harmful to morale and discipline. The Navy is not required to 
produce social science data or the results of controlled 
experiments to prove what common sense and common 
experience demonstrate.238 
Judge Bork accepted without question the Navy’s assertion that the 
purpose of the challenged regulation was to promote morale. By Judge 
Bork’s own admission, he believed that same-sex relationships within 
the military would likely “generate dislike and disapproval among many 
who find homosexuality morally offensive.”239 Judge Bork, however, did 
not think that it was necessary to determine whether dislike and 
disapproval were the actual motivation for the policy or whether there 
was any evidence that same-sex relationships were in fact harmful to 
morale. 
Recently, in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Lawrence 
that the Due Process Clause provides some measure of protection for the 
private, consensual sexual acts of adults, several federal courts have 
applied heightened scrutiny to the military’s exclusion of gays.240 The 
level of scrutiny applied in these cases was somewhere between 
deferential rationality and strict scrutiny. Two of these cases241 adopted a 
standard that the U.S. Supreme Court used in Sell v. United States,242 a 
due process case about the forcible administration of medication. Under 
Sell’s standard, the challenged government action must significantly 
further and be necessary to an important governmental interest.243 This 
is obviously a more demanding standard even than heightened 
rationality, but it does mimic some of the heightened rationality 
standard, particularly in its insistence on a very real and clear correlation 
between classification and purpose. 
                                                     
238. Id. at 1398. 
239. Id. 
240. See, e.g., Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008); Witt v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 
F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2008); Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884 (C.D. Cal. 
2010). 
241. Witt, 527 F.3d at 818–19; Log Cabin Republicans, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 911 (citing Witt, 527 
F.3d at 819–21, for the three-part test adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Sell v. United States, 
539 U.S. 166 (2002)). 
242. 539 U.S. 166 (2003). 
243. See Witt, 527 F.3d at 818–19 (discussing heightened scrutiny under Sell). 
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Recently, in Log Cabin Republicans v. United States,244 a district 
court in California applied this heightened-scrutiny standard to the 
military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy and concluded that the policy 
was unconstitutional. The court, following the language of the current 
statute, identified the purpose of the law as maintaining “morale, good 
order, and discipline and unit cohesion.”245 The court appeared to 
concede without discussion that these concerns constituted an important 
governmental purpose and thus satisfied the last prong of the Sell test.246 
The court went on to find, however, that the exclusion of gays from the 
military did not significantly further these interests.247 Specifically, the 
court found that results of the policy included (1) the discharge of 
qualified service members despite troop shortages, (2) the discharge of 
service members with critically needed skills and training, (3) a 
hindrance to military recruiting, and (4) the admission of lesser-qualified 
enlistees.248 Further, the exclusion of gays was not necessary to protect 
unit cohesion and privacy.249 
Even though it is a substantive due process case, Log Cabin 
Republicans stands as a template for a heightened-rationality challenge 
under the Equal Protection Clause. The court’s insistence that there in 
fact be a correlation between the classification and the purpose, rather 
than just some conceivable relationship between the two, is a hallmark 
of heightened rationality.250 Thus, a court applying equal protection’s 
heightened rationality could similarly find that the exclusion of gays 
from the military does not in fact advance the goals of morale and unit 
cohesion. This demand for evidence of an actual connection between 
sexual orientation and morale is in marked contrast to the decisions of 
previous federal courts that gave the impression that they had no choice 
but to accept the assertions of generals that “the presence of open 
homosexuality would have an unacceptable detrimental and disruptive 
impact on the cohesion, morale, and esprit of the armed forces,”251 and 
                                                     
244. 716 F. Supp. 2d 884 (C.D. Cal. 2010), appeal docketed, No. 10-56634 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 
2010). 
245. Id. at 910 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 654(a) (2006)). 
246. Id. at 922 (assuming for argument’s sake that military readiness and unit cohesion are 
“important”). 
247. See id. at 911–19. 
248. See id. at 919. 
249. See id. at 919–23. 
250. See supra Part II.B. 
251. Cook v. Rumsfeld, 429 F. Supp. 2d 385, 399 n.20 (D. Mass. 2006) (quoting statement of 
Gen. Colin Powell, S. Rep. No. 103-112, at 275, 278 (1993)). 
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that “the introduction of an open homosexual into a small unit 
immediately polarizes that unit and destroys the very bonding that is so 
important for the unit’s survival in time of war.”252 
Because Congress has now repealed “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,”253 
arguments that the policy violates equal protection are now moot. 
Nevertheless, one part of the argument remains important because of its 
bearing on other laws that disadvantage same-sex couples. This is the 
argument that the policy rests not on legitimate public concerns but on 
illegitimate animosity toward a particular group. With regard to the 
exclusion of gays from the military, there was plain evidence that the 
policy had in fact been adopted out of hostility toward gay men and 
women. According to a litigation affidavit from the Assistant Chief of 
Naval Personnel, “Tensions and hostilities would certainly exist between 
known homosexuals and the great majority of naval personnel who 
despise/detest homosexuality, especially in the unique close living 
conditions aboard ships.”254 
As a federal appeals court explained in Beller v. Middendorf:255 
[T]he Navy could conclude that a substantial number of naval 
personnel have feelings regarding homosexuality, based upon 
moral precepts recognized by many in our society as legitimate, 
which would create tensions and hostilities, and that these 
feelings might undermine the ability of a homosexual to 
command the respect necessary to perform supervisory duties.256 
To the extent that a court, applying the heightened version of 
rationality, was willing to conclude that the actual purpose of excluding 
gays from the military was to give effect to the prejudice of military 
personnel (who “despise/detest homosexuality”), then that purpose is 
impermissible.257 The “tensions and hostilities” argument, which 
purports to be about maintaining morale and unit cohesion, is instead 
                                                     
252. Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 929 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting statement of Gen. H. 
Norman Schwarzkopf, S. REP. NO. 112, at 280)). 
253. See supra note 233. 
254. Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 811 n.22 (9th Cir. 1980) (emphasis added) (citation 
omitted). 
255. 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980). 
256. Id. at 811–12. 
257. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (noting that classifications are not to be 
drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law); City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446–47 (1985) (holding that irrational prejudice against the 
mentally disabled is not a permissible purpose); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). 
(“Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give 
them effect.”). 
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likely to be evidence of hostility toward a particular group. As one 
district court258 explained, gays are no different from many other groups 
in terms of creating “tensions and hostilities.” The court declared: 
But the particulars specified could in each case be grounds for 
excluding other persons as well. Thus, “tensions and hostilities” 
could justify exclusion of members of minorities or other 
persons who also may be “despised” by some; disruptive 
emotional relationships could exist between male and female 
Navy personnel justifying exclusion of women; parents may 
become concerned over their children associating with Navy 
personnel who may gamble, use alcohol or drugs or engage in 
illicit heterosexual relations; persons other than homosexuals 
may engage in disruptive physical aggression; and fear of 
criminal prosecution, social stigma and divorce and the danger 
of undue influence is a risk created by any form of illegal or 
antisocial conduct, not confined to homosexuality.259 
So, if the Navy can exclude gays because of its fear of tensions and 
hostilities, then by extension it should be able to exclude minorities, 
women, gamblers, alcoholics, drug users, those in engaged in 
extramarital sex, those who are physically aggressive, and so on, without 
end. So if the government wants to minimize tensions and hostilities, it 
needs to explain why one particular group was singled out to bear the 
brunt of that decision. At the end of World War II, “both the Army chief 
of staff and the Secretary of the Navy justified racial segregation in the 
ranks as necessary to maintain efficiency, discipline, and morale.”260 
Yet, it would be “unthinkable”261 that the judiciary today would defer to 
the military’s “‘professional’ judgment that black and white soldiers had 
to be segregated to avoid interracial tensions.”262 Similarly, heightened 
rationality would make it unthinkable for courts to defer to the judgment 
of some in the military that gay persons cannot serve. 
                                                     
258. Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev’d sub nom. Beller v. 
Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 812 (9th Cir. 1980). 
259. Saal, 427 F. Supp. at 201. 
260. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1350 (9th Cir. 1988), opinion withdrawn on reh’g, 
875 F.2d 699, 729 (9th Cir. 1989).  
261. Id. 
262. Id. 
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C. The Defense of Marriage Act 
DOMA263 is a federal statute that provides, inter alia, that for federal 
purposes “the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one 
man and one woman as husband and wife.”264 Federal courts have 
considered the question of whether or not this statute satisfies the 
rational-basis test of the equal protection component of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Predictably, the courts have reached 
inconsistent results, once again depending on whether the court applies 
the deferential or more demanding version of rationality.265 
In re Kandu266 is an example of the deferential version. In that case, 
two women who had been legally married in Canada filed a joint 
bankruptcy petition.267 The bankruptcy court did not allow the joint 
filing because the marriage was not recognized under DOMA.268 The 
debtors then argued that DOMA was a violation of equal protection.269 
The court, citing both Heller and Beach Communications, held that the 
challenger’s burden is to “‘negative every conceivable basis which 
might support [the statute],’ whether or not the basis has a foundation in 
the record.”270 The bankruptcy trustee, defending DOMA, argued that 
DOMA satisfied the rational-basis test because it “further[ed] the 
legitimate government interest in encouraging the development of 
relationships optimal for procreating and raising children.”271 The court 
cited no evidence that these were the purposes of the statute other than 
the assertion of the trustee. This is the classic “post hoc rationalization of 
                                                     
263. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). 
264. See id. § 3(a), 110 Stat. at 2419 (amending chapter 1 of title 1, United States Code, to add 
this definition of marriage). 
265. On February 23, 2011, the Attorney General of the United States announced that the Justice 
Department would no longer defend section 3 of DOMA in those circuits where a heightened level 
of scrutiny would apply. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Attorney General on 
Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-222.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2011). However, 
the statement also indicated that reasonable arguments can be made that section 3 satisfies rational-
basis review. Id. Furthermore, the statement indicated that section 3 of DOMA would remain in 
effect unless Congress repeals it or there is a final judicial finding that strikes it down, and that the 
executive branch would continue to enforce the law. Id. Thus, the question of the rationality of 
DOMA is still to be determined. 
266. 315 B.R. 123 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004). 
267. Id. at 130. 
268. Id. at 130, 133–34. 
269. See id. at 141. 
270. Id. at 144 (citations omitted). 
271. Id. at 145. 
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government attorneys” that is an acceptable source of purpose under the 
deferential version of rational-basis review.272 The debtors, who had the 
burden of demonstrating that the statute was not rational, pointed out 
that the same-sex classification was not well correlated with these 
purposes. They argued that there were two problems with the 
procreation and child-rearing justifications: on the one hand, “federal 
recognition of marriage has never been limited to couples willing or able 
to conceive and raise children,”273 and on the other hand, “same-sex 
couples can reproduce with outside assistance.”274 Thus, the statute 
recognized marriages of couples who could not or would not procreate 
yet refused to recognize marriages of couples who could and would 
procreate. 
The court responded, “Authority exists that the promotion of marriage 
to encourage the maintenance of stable relationships that facilitate to the 
maximum extent possible the rearing of children by both of their 
biological parents is a legitimate congressional concern.”275 The court 
cited favorably the argument that “the presence of both male and female 
authority figures in the home is critical to optimal childhood 
development.”276 With regard to the fact that heterosexual couples could 
marry without any intention of having children and the fact that same-
sex couples do raise children, the court saw that as a simple problem of 
over- and under-inclusion,277 something that courts find permissible 
under the deferential rational-basis review. With regard to the 
assumption imbedded in the statute that opposite-sex couples are better 
at rearing children than are same-sex couples, the court explained that 
the trustee need not produce any “evidence to sustain the rationality of a 
statutory classification”278 and that “a legislative choice is not subject to 
courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation 
unsupported by evidence or empirical data.”279 The court further found 
that “the lack of ‘scientifically valid studies tending to establish a 
negative impact on the adjustment of children raised by an intact same-
                                                     
272. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. 
273. Kandu, 315 B.R. at 145. 
274. Id. 
275. Id. at 146. 
276. Id. (citations omitted). 
277. See id. at 146–47. 
278. Id. at 144 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)).  
279. Id. at 146 n.9 (citing FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993)). 
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sex couple’”280 is not a problem in that “it is not incumbent on the 
government to produce any evidence for the record.”281 
The Kandu court distinguished Romer on the grounds that it involved 
an enactment “inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it 
affects.”282 DOMA, on the other hand, “simply codified that definition of 
marriage historically understood by society.”283 Finally, because the 
bankruptcy trustee did not rely on four additional justifications for 
DOMA that were contained in a House Report,284 the court did not 
consider them, but instead explained that “the government has a 
‘conceivable’ legitimate interest.”285 
In contrast to the very deferential version of rational-basis review in 
Kandu, a district court in Massachusetts applied the more demanding 
version of rational-basis review to DOMA in Gill v. Office of Personnel 
Management.286 Unlike the court in Kandu, the Gill court looked to the 
actual purposes of the law as identified in the legislative history and 
insisted that there be an actual connection between the same-sex 
classification and those purposes. The court noted that the government 
defendant in Gill had “disavowed Congress’s stated justifications for the 
statute” but that those identified purposes were still not “utterly 
irrelevant.”287 The first legislative purpose identified in the House 
Report was encouraging responsible procreation and child-bearing.288 
The court determined that there was no rational connection between the 
same-sex classification and this purpose, because “a consensus has 
developed . . . that children raised by gay and lesbian parents are just as 
likely to be well-adjusted as those raised by heterosexual parents.”289 
Even if Congress had been concerned with a biological connection 
between parent and child, denying marriage to same-sex couples “does 
nothing to promote stability in heterosexual parenting.”290 Further, 
because the ability to procreate has never been a precondition that would 
exclude heterosexuals from marriage, the interest in encouraging 
                                                     
280. Id. 
281. Id.  
282. Id. at 147 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996)). 
283. Id. at 148. 
284. See id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 12 (1996)). 
285. Id. 
286. 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010). 
287. Id. at 388. 
288. See id. 
289. Id. 
290. See id. at 388–89. 
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procreation cannot justify the exclusion of same-sex couples from 
marriage.291 
With regard to the government’s second asserted interest—defending 
and nurturing the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage—the 
Gill court found that this interest was “not ‘grounded in sufficient factual 
context,’”292 for the court could not see how denying marriage to same-
sex couples was likely either to encourage gay persons to marry persons 
of the opposite sex or to make heterosexual marriages more secure.293 
Because the exclusion of same-sex couples did not in fact nurture 
traditional marriage, the court determined that “what remains” is a 
congressional desire “to make heterosexual marriage appear more 
valuable or desirable.”294 That, however, was not a proper goal because, 
under Moreno, a bare to desire to harm is not a permissible interest. 
With regard to the third Congressional goal—defending traditional 
notions of morality—the court concluded that this objective was 
prohibited by Lawrence.295 With regard to Congress’s fourth and last 
goal, preserving scarce resources, there needed to be some neutral 
explanation of why this particular group was singled out to preserve 
resources, but the court found no such reason, finding only “a desire to 
express its disapprobation of same-sex marriage.”296 
The Gill court then moved on from the purposes identified in the 
legislative history to the purposes introduced for the first time in the 
course of the litigation. The first of these purposes was the desire to 
preserve the status quo “pending the resolution of a socially contentious 
debate taking place in the states over whether to sanction same-sex 
marriage.”297 The court found two flaws in this argument. First, 
assuming that preserving the status quo is a permissible purpose, DOMA 
disrupted that status. Before DOMA, the federal government had 
recognized any marriage declared valid under state law, because 
domestic relations had always been considered the “exclusive province 
of the states.”298 DOMA had in fact departed from the status quo by 
requiring the federal government to select which state-sanctioned 
marriages it would recognize. In addition, the court raised the question 
                                                     
291. See id. at 389. 
292. Id. (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632–33 (1996)). 
293. See id. 
294. Id. 
295. See id. at 389–90. 
296. Id. at 390. 
297. Id. 
298. Id. at 391. 
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of whether preserving the status quo is by itself a legitimate 
governmental interest, because preserving the status quo is something of 
a tautology, doing “nothing more than describ[ing] what DOMA 
does.”299 
The Government also argued that DOMA served the interests of 
consistency in the distribution of federal marriage benefits and of 
minimizing the administrative burden presented by a changing 
patchwork of state marriage laws.300 Here again, the court found that 
these interests were not credible as the real justification for a law that in 
fact singled out same-sex couples alone to pay the price of consistency 
and efficiency. 
Finally, having weighed all the Government’s alleged purposes and 
the alleged connection that same-sex relationships had to those purposes, 
the Gill court concluded: 
  In sum, this court is soundly convinced, based on the 
foregoing analysis, that the government’s proffered rationales, 
past and current, are without “footing in the realities of the 
subject addressed by [DOMA].” And “when the proffered 
rationales for a law are clearly and manifestly implausible, a 
reviewing court may infer that animus is the only explicable 
basis. [Because] animus alone cannot constitute a legitimate 
government interest,” this court finds that DOMA lacks a 
rational basis to support it.301 
CONCLUSION 
This Article presented the two versions of rational-basis review, one 
deferential and one demanding, and then demonstrated in a particular 
context that the existence of two versions of the same rule produces 
inconsistency and unpredictability. Do laws that treat gay persons worse 
than heterosexuals violate the Equal Protection Clause? It depends on 
which version of rational-basis review a court uses. A law that gives 
effect to prejudice or stereotype should be deemed to violate the Equal 
Protection Clause, but under the deferential version of rational-basis 
review, it is not likely that a court, hypothesizing permissible purposes, 
will ever consider the evidence that prejudice or stereotype is the actual 
                                                     
299. Id. at 393. Of course, the assertion that DOMA preserves the status quo is correct only if one 
assumes that one particular version of the status quo (where the federal government recognizes only 
opposite-sex marriage) is correct, rather than an alternative version of the status quo (where the 
federal government recognizes all state-sanctioned marriages).  
300. Id. at 394–95. 
301. Id. at 396. 
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purpose of a law. Deferential rational-basis review purports to give 
effect to the will of the majority and to limit the power of unelected 
judges to impose their views on the other branches of government. The 
more demanding version of rational-basis review, on the other hand, 
recognizes that the U.S. Constitution takes certain decisions away from 
the majority to protect individual interests. The fact that there are two 
versions of what purports to be a single standard means that lower 
federal and state courts will continue to produce conflicting precedents. 
 
